STAFFING, PROCEDURE ERRORS LET FIRE GET OUT OF CONTROL, REPORT SAYS

Park Service panel eyes Los Alamos blaze

By Deborah Frazier,
Rocky Mountain News Staff Writer

Fire managers at last summer's devastating Los Alamos, N.M., fire followed established policy, a new report says, but they FAILED TO STAFF THE PRESCRIBED BURN ADEQUATELY or create firebreaks that could have contained it. (emphasis added)

The result was a blaze that leaped out of control over 15 days, consuming 47,650 acres, leveling 235 homes and causing $1 billion in damage.
(but no BASE jumps were made during that time.)

"The National Park Service as an institution bears substantial responsibility for the Cerro Grande Fire," the Park Service's Board of Inquiry said in the report released Tuesday.

The report also said weather forecasting was inadequate, managers were pushed to carry out the burn in spite of unfavorable conditions, and staff expertise was lacking.

"Investigations found that direction provided by the agency was inadequate and the agency's policies themselves had weakness," said the board, which reviewed the findings of the investigation that was launched in the aftermath of the fire that began on May 4, 2000.

(sounds like they're taling about the BASE policy)

The Park Service has taken responsibility from the first day for the Cerro Grande Fire, which began when high winds pushed a prescribed fire at Bandelier National Monument out of control.

But the board of inquiry's report further implicated the agency in pointing out the service's failure to hire or train fire crews or buy additional equipment and change policies as required under the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy of 1995.

In fact, none of the land-management agencies had been able to implement the 1995 policy until last year's fires prompted Congress to allocate $2 billion to fire programs in the West, said Bill Schenke, inquiry board chairman.

"The whole fire season last year showed the need to manage large landscape fires better," Schenke said. "Cerro Grande was the grand wake-up call, but the phone continued ringing throughout the summer."

Had the 1995 plan been fully followed, "it would have had an influence on some things, including getting crews and training," said Schenke, director of the Midwest Region of the Park Service.

The board, however, found no evidence that any monument employee had violated rules or regulations and recommended no discipline against any individual.

This pleased former monument superintendent Roy Weaver, who retired early. Weaver had predicted the board would clear Bandelier officials and was pleased by Tuesday's report. But he stopped short of calling it a vindication.

"The board of inquiry report might be good for us in that it helps the people know we were not negligent or running amok out there setting the woods on fire, (but) it still does not help the people of Los Alamos," Weaver said. "That's a regret that's never, ever going to go away."

Three other employees directly involved with the prescribed burn have been reassigned. The board recommended additional training for them and their replacements.

The board of inquiry, a group of top-level park officials, concluded that five factors were critical to the fire's rampage:




The analysis of the prescribed burn didn't match conditions in the area on the date the fire was started, so there weren't enough firefighters on hand.

The "burn boss," Mike Powell, failed to recognize that replacement crews needed to be found on the first night of the fire.

Confusion and delays in manning the fire lines on the second day of the fire let the flames escape control.

The fire on the west side of the burn was extended, creating a source of fire that found heavy fuels, jumped a road and ran beyond control into Frijoles Canyon.

Unexpected extreme winds pushed the fire out of the planned burn area.




The Associated Press contributed to this report.


June 13, 2001